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To Press, Or Not to Press the Button? 
Timo Kivimäki, University of Bath 
 
British Labor leader Jeremy Corbyn shocked the British and the Western public, including his own 
supporters, by declaring  that he would "not press the nuclear button" if he was the prime minister. 
Corbyn's objections to the UK nuclear deterrent were both moral and practical: "Nuclear weapons 
are weapons of mass destruction that take out millions of civilians. They didn't do the USA much 
good on 9/11." At the same time, nuclear weapons have been defended on similar moral and 
practical grounds as instruments that can deter the threat of a nuclear holocaust: According to the 
former Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Anders Fought Rasmussen 
”Ultimately, while we all hope and think it will not be necessary to use a nuclear capability, if you 
put in doubt whether you are willing to use the military capabilities you do have then you also 
undermine the strength of your deterrent.” (Ridge, 2015)  
 
The debate on the impact on the Brittish deterrence of the statement, as well as about the premises 
of the UK nuclear deterrent has been a disappointment. The roots of the logic of nuclear deterrence 
have not been revisited and the underlying assumptions have not been questioned. This article will 
visit the premises of the British nuclear deterrent and take a look at two core questions underlying 
the continued usefulness of British nuclear deterrent: one related to morality and the other related to 
credibility.  
 
The Premises of the Mutual Assured Destruction 
Once both the Soviet Union and the United States had managed to develop their nuclear arsenal, 
and especially after it became possible to launch nuclear strikes from submarines it soon became 
technically impossible to defend either country against the military threat of the other. Instead of 
defence, therefore, both countries needed to develop capabilities to deter each others' nuclear 
attacks by developing the capacity to launch a devastating second strike after surviving the enemy's 
first strike. If it was not possible for either nation to wipe out each others' military capacity by one 
singly nuclear attack, nuclear first strike became irrational for both, as the other could always 
launch a second strike that could inflict intolerable pain on the initial aggressor. According to the 
theory of Mutual Assured Destruction, both sides needed the capacity to hit population centers after 
a first strike to be able to deter the other from the first strike. This theory developed early in the 
1950s and was reconstructed in the most clear and elegant manner by the US Defense Secretary 
Robert McNamara in his speech in 1967 (McNamara, 1967).  
 
The British nuclear deterrent follows the logic of McNamara's speech. The British capacity is not 
extensive, but it is well protected, as it can be launched from nuclear submarines that can be hidden 
practically anywhere in the oceans of the world. With a small force the United Kingdom cannot 
dream of wiping out en enemy's military capacity, but since the force is well hidden, the country can 
launch a devastating second strike regardless of the force of the initial aggression by the opponent. 
Jeremy Corbyn is right that the prospect of a second strike cannot safeguard the country against 
well hidden terrorists, who are often insensitive of deterrence (especially the suicide bombers). Yet, 
it can deter other nuclear states, say Russia or future Iran, from trying to defeat the United Kingdom 
by using nuclear weapons.  
 
Dilemmas of Morality and Credibility 
We often assume that since nuclear weapons are material and they can hurt us regardless of what 
meanings we give to them that we cannot argue against materially based military realities. Nuclear 
threat is seen real ragardless of whether our opponent is smart enough to understand it and nuclear 
safety, too, is a seen as something that comes directly from our possession of the material resources 
for nuclear deterrence. However, such military realities are also based on assumptions that we are 
able to question. The bomb is a meaningful reality only if we give it a meaning.  
 
During the Second World War both sides used the so-called aerial bombardments, or ”morale 
bambing” as a tactics against their enemies. Such tactics were also expensively used by the British 
Royal Airforce especially since year 1942. The intention was to hit civilian centers in order to 
influence the leaders and the fighters of the enemy. If soldiers and decision-makers were aware of 
the fact that the war was destroying their homes and their families, were they not less determined to 
continue such a war (Hansen, 2009)? Thus after the war there were no difficulties in justifying a 
strategy that targetted civilians in order to influence and deter leaders and military elites of potential 
enemies. Today, once the war on terror has become the main security obsession of many Western 
states, undoubtedly also the United Kingdom, the idea of targeting civilians in order to influence 
one's enemy has received a bad name. This is, after all, the tactics we call terrorism. Is it, therefore, 
ethically possible for the United Kingdom to base its strategic thinking on a doctrine of nuclear 
deterrrence that targets civilians in order to influence UK's enemies. Given the ethical restrictions is 
the strategy of nuclear deterrent credible even when the prime minister is someone else than Jeremy 
Corbyn? 
   
In addition to moral dilemmas nuclear deterrence poses also practical dilemmas. Is the strategy of 
second strike credible any longer? During the early 1950s the Western thinking was not muh 
concerned of the sufferings of people in the communist East. The defence of the freedom of the 
West was the main preoccupation of nuclear deterrence. Today, however, the world is genuinely 
concerned of civilians regardless of where they are. Military operations, such as the one to topple 
the ruthless authoritarianism of Muammar Gaddafy of Libya, or Saddam Hussain of Iraq, let alone 
the brutal Taliban order in Afghanistan and the Islamic State repression in Syria and Iraq, were 
launched to protect civilians globally.  
 
Furthremore, we no longer believe that all rulers are concerned of the welbeing of their civilians. In 
2005 the United Nations accepted to the idea of the right of countries to protect civilians of other 
countries in case their leaders did not respect their own responsibility to protect their civilians 
(International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2005) We are also talking about 
the right to launch humanitarian interventions to countries in which autocrats refuse to offer humane 
order to their civilians (Wheeler, 2000) President George W. Bush declared in 2002 his opposition 
to tyrants who were indifferent about the suffering of their own people and showed that he, and the 
West, were actually more sensitive of the fate of ordinary people in North Korea, Iran and other 
tyrannies (Bush, 2002) Today, the sensitivity towards the sufferings of their people of leaders of 
several nuclear powers and states aspiring nuclear weapons, such as North Korea, Russia and Iran, 
has been doubted. How can then the idea of a second strike be credible if we ourselves are more 
sensitive towards the civilians we threaten to kill with our second strike. Is it not like threatening to 
shoot one's own foot when we threaten tyrants with a second strike?  
 
The foundation of British strategic security requires ideas and assumptions that we can no longer be 
sure of. Regardless of what the opposition leader says, on the long run nuclear deterrence seems an 
unconvincing foundation for the country's security. While material foundations might remain the 
same, ideas that give them meanings change and this is a reality that was not born in the recent 
speech by Jeremy Corbyn.  
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